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MARYLAND'S 1993 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT-
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONERS
STEVEN A. LEVENSON*
INTRODUCTION
Maryland's new Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA)1 addresses
many issues previously covered under various statutes, case law, ethics
debates, and nonbinding attorney general's opinions. The new law
has many potential benefits for patients and for health care providers,
including physicians. It reinforces the roles of the various partici-
pants-patients, families, doctors, health care facilities-but also ac-
knowledges their limitations and offers several checks and balances.
Health care practitioners (HCPs) have always had a prominent
role in ethical decisionmaking in health care. However, for reasons
such as fear, misunderstanding, and disinterest, this participation-
especially by physicians-has been inconsistent and sometimes ob-
structive. The HCDA should ease physicians' fears and help improve
their participation in ethical decisionmaking. This Article discusses
this and other implications of the new law for HCPs-the possible
problems of implementing the law while making the best possible de-
cisions for patients, and ways in which health care providers, public
policy makers, and attorneys can help ensure that the HCDA achieves
its intended benefits.
I. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
The HCDA is based on many commonly accepted concepts. The
HCPs involved in ethical decisionmaking, however, may not be famil-
iar with those concepts, nor do they necessarily share a common un-
derstanding of them. Even when participants concede their
differences, the sources of disagreement may not be adequately un-
* Dr. Steven Levenson is currently medical director of Asbury Methodist Village in
Gaithersburg, Maryland. Dr. Levenson has helped pass several major medical ethics-re-
lated laws in Maryland in the past decade. He has written numerous articles, book chap-
ters, and monographs in the areas of geriatrics, medical ethics, medical computing, quality
assurance, and medical direction, and is the editor and principal author of Medical Direction
in Long-Term Care and Medical Policies and Procedures for Long-Term Care, two comprehensive
references for long-term care practitioners.
1. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994) [hereinafter HCDA].
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derstood and reconciled. Consistent, systematic processes are essen-
tial in order to accommodate diverse values and desires effectively. 2
In the past-when laymen were considered incapable of under-
standing complex medical information-physicians often made treat-
ment decisions for their patients. Many physicians had trouble seeing
medical care as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. They
followed the simple principle that an available treatment ought to be
used. For example, most physicians would insist on treating a patient
with surgery or antibiotics, regardless of any patient or family expres-
sions to the contrary. Also, treatment options were often limited.
As medical technology has advanced, and possible treatment in-
terventions have proliferated, the value of many medical treatment
options has become questionable. After years of debate, attitudes
about the role of medical care in people's lives and the role of physi-
cians in selecting medical care for ill individuals have changed.
Now it is widely accepted that medical care is a means to an end,
which should serve a useful purpose.4 Moreover, the decision to inter-
vene and the degree of desirable intervention must be individualized,
depending on a person's wishes, condition, and prognosis. The treat-
ment itself may be based in science, but the choice of whether to have
treatment is not a scientific matter.
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed that competent
individuals have a constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest to reject
any or all life-sustaining procedures.5 This involves decisions about
medical care, including withholding or withdrawing such life-sus-
taining procedures as mechanical ventilation or artificial nutrition
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: SUMMING UP (1983).
3. Darrel W. Amundsen, The Physician's Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical Duty With-
out Classical Roots, HASTINGS CTR. RP., Aug. 1978, at 23, 27 ("The only duty common to
probably all Greco-Roman physicians was 'to help,' or at least do no harm.").
4. See id. at 23 (asserting that the modem duty to prolong life does not have any
origins in classical medicine); see also Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility
Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955 (1988); David Hilfiker, Allowing the
Debilitated to Die: Facing Our Ethical Choices, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 716 (1983) (commenting
on the myth of "maximum possible care" and reality of compromise in treating "the old,
chronically ill, debilitated, or mentally impaired").
5. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The princi-
ple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."); see also Bernard
Lo & Robert Steinbrook, Beyond the Cruzan Case: The US. Supreme Court and Medical Prac-
tice, 114 ANNALS ITr.AL MED. 895 (1991) (discussing the unresolved clinical questions
and potentially harmful consequences of the Cruzan decision); George J. Annas, Nancy
Cruzan and the Right to Die, 323 NEW ENG.J. MED. 670 (1991) (discussing Cruzan within the
context of Quinlan).
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and hydration. Health care providers, including physicians, must ac-
commodate patients who request limitations on care. This, however,
does not prevent the physician from discussing treatment options or
from trying to influence patient choices.6
Selecting a treatment plan is the endpoint of a bi-directional pro-
cess combining components of clinical and ethical decisionmaking.7
The "patient-centered" direction considers a person's current or pre-
viously expressed wishes or directives and their current capacity for
considering information or reviewing those wishes. The "care-giver-
centered" direction reviews the potential treatment options, their risks
and benefits, and the relevance of those options to an individual's
wishes, current condition, and prognosis.
II. HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE HCDA
The HCDA specifies a number of rights and responsibilities for
physicians in implementing the law's provisions. Under the HCDA,
health care providers-practitioners and facilities-must honor the
valid instructions of patients and their appointed agents, court-ap-
pointed guardians, or appropriately selected surrogate deci-
sionmakers. The law anticipates and addresses situations where the
physician and the decisionmaker disagree on the appropriateness of
the request.
This law establishes and expands guidelines that should help phy-
sicians be more constructive participants in the ethics decisionmaking
process. Because physicians still have considerable authority to define
reality and to guide treatment selection, they may help or hinder deci-
sionmaking, depending on how they assert their rights and fulfill their
responsibilities. The law should also help patients and other practi-
tioners be more effective participants.
Health care practitioner responsibilities as a direct or indirect re-
sult of the HCDA include: (1) helping interpret existing advance di-
rectives; (2) informing others about known existing advance
directives; (3) helping decide who is capable of making medical deci-
sions and to what degree; (4) helping determine how current medical
circumstances relate to a patient's wishes; (5) helping determine
when patients meet qualifying criteria for limiting certain treatments;
6. See Lo & Steinbrook, supra note 5, at 899-900 (suggesting that physicians should
provide alternatives and encourage the use of advance directives "to minimize" the poten-
tially harmful effects of Cruzan).
7. See genera//y STEVEN A. LEVENSON, MEDICAL DIRECTION IN LONc-TERM CARE: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR THE FUTURE (1993) (presenting a model that incorporates both clinical
and ethical concerns in developing long-term care treatment plans).
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(6) witnessing and documenting patient instructions; (7) honoring le-
gally valid wishes; (8) interpreting the potential effectiveness of pro-
posed treatments; (9) proposing patient transfers in cases of
irreconcilable differences; and (10) guiding facility staffs, judges, and
others in making competency determinations, in guardianship pro-
ceedings, and in decisions about whether to withhold or withdraw
treatments.
The potential successes and problems of these components of the
law are considered throughout the following discussion.
A. Help Those Drafting Advance Directives
Advance directives are written or oral statements made by individ-
uals capable of stating their general or specific wishes about their
medical care in advance of situations in which they are unable to
make decisions or express those wishes.8 The HCDA supports the
right of competent adults to make an advance directive and gives
equal weight to both written 9 and oral'0 advance directives. An ad-
vance directive may give instructions about future health care, appoint
an agent, or both."
An "agent" is someone that a person making an advance directive
specifically appoints to make health-care decisions if that person be-
comes incapacitated.'" An individual does not have to appoint an
agent in an advance directive. A "surrogate" decisionmaker is some-
one permitted to act for an incapacitated individual under the condi-
tions described in the law, even in the absence of an advance directive
or when an individual fails to appoint an agent."3
A patient's currently expressed wishes should be considered per-
tinent unless the person is adjudicated as incompetent or certified by
physicians in accordance with the HCDA to be incapable of making
health care decisions.'" Advance directives should be considered
credible substitutes for such instructions. Although the HCDA offers
8. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602 (1994).
9. Id. § 5-602(a).
10. Id. § 5-602(d).
11. See generaly id. §§ 5-602 to -603.
12. See id. § 5-602(b)(1) (stating that "[a]ny competent individual may, at any time,
make a written advance directive appointing an agent to make health care decisions for the
individual under the circumstances stated in the advance directive.").
13. Id. § 5-605(a)(2).
14. Id. § 5-602(e).
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immunity for good faith adherence to directives,15 some practitioners
may be unwilling to resist badgering or threats from family members
wishing to overturn these instructions. Since advance directives would
be less valuable if they could be readily ignored once a person became
incapacitated, those making them should be reassured that their re-
quests will be respected at the appropriate time.
The HCDA provides a model living will and a two-part advance
directive-appointment of health care agent and health care instruc-
tions t6-but does not require that any particular format be followed.
Advance directives made prior to October 1, 1993, when the HCDA
took effect, remain valid and should not require rewriting.17 The in-
clusion of these suggested forms within the Act may create several po-
tential problems that should be addressed. First, the living will form is
redundant, since the advance directive form can be used to cover ter-
minal illness. Second, the living will form alone does not cover all
possible situations. Third, some people may not understand that
these formats provided in the statute are not required and that others
may be used. Finally, it may not be clear that the "advance directive"
form is comparable to a durable power of attorney form containing
both a treatment and a proxy directive component. Health care prov-
iders and attorneys should explain these points to people contemplat-
ing making directives.
The HCDA reinforces the need for both HCPs and other advi-
sors, such as attorneys, to help patients prepare advance directives. In
doing so, they should consider several important principles. Patients
often ask what their advance directive should contain. Providers
should emphasize the directive's content and scope more than its
form. Any wishes about health care choices could be stated in several
ways, either by treatment categories, or by situation. For example, a
treatment-specific directive might say, "I do not want to be placed on a
ventilator under any circumstances." A situation-specific directive
might say,
If my condition is such that aggressive medical intervention,
including life-sustaining procedures, no longer are likely to
make a difference in outcome or improve my quality of life, I
would not want them to be used. However, if a treatment
15. See id. § 5-609(d) (providing that "[a]uthorization for the provision, withholding, or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with this subtitle shall be presumed
to have been made in good faith.").
16. Id. § 5-603.
17. Id. § 5-616.
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may help reverse my condition, I would request that it be
given.
The forms provided with the HCDA are primarily situation-specific
directives with the option to add treatment-specific directives.
Some physicians are concerned about the limitations of treat-
ment-specific directives, which may exclude a treatment even when it
may do some good. While there is some merit to this argument, some
people may also not want a treatment under any circumstances or may
want it under some conditions but not others.
HCPs should advise those drafting directives, and consider the
time spent discussing them with patients as preventive health care.
Helping a patient understand their options and the reasons why some
treatment choices are more consistent with their wishes and values
than others, can prevent confusion and anguish when crises arise.
HCPs and other advisors, including attorneys, should encourage
balanced directives that are as explicit as the individual desires, but
flexible enough to accommodate the ambiguities of clinical decision-
making. They should also encourage directives that appoint an agent
who can make decisions about specific treatments when the need
arises, based on those instructions.
B. Witnessing and Documenting Patient Instructions
The HCDA contains some explicit requirements for HCPs. For
example, they must witness and document oral patient instructions.1 8
This is a critical role for physicians because they are considered credi-
ble witnesses who can understand the subtleties and implications of a
patient's statements.
Physicians also must inform appropriate parties if they know that
an advance directive exists and make it part of the declarant's medical
record."9 Many physicians care for their patients at more than one
care site; for example, both in the nursing home and the hospital.
Their duty to ensure that others are aware of the advance directive is
not facility specific. In other words, physicians should help facilities
become aware of existing directives even if they are not going to fol-
low the patient in a facility.
An advance directive recorded in one facility should be honored
subsequently by other facilities. The staff of transferring facilities
18. See id. § 5-602(d) (asserting that an "oral directive shall have the same effect as a
written advance directive if made in the presence of the attending physician and one wit-
ness and documented as part of the individual's medical record.").
19. Id. § 5-602.
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should ensure that information about a written or oral advance direc-
tive is sent to a receiving facility. A facility or practitioner questioning
an advance directive's legitimacy should refer the matter for discus-
sion-for example, to a facility-based patient care advisory commit-
tee-rather than just refuse to honor it.
An oral advance directive made after October 1, 1993, must be
made in the presence of the attending physician and another wit-
ness.20 Of the two witnesses required, the physician should document
in the greatest detail. 21 She should either quote or precisely para-
phrase what the patient has said in enough detail to avoid subsequent
misunderstanding. A progress note that states, "The patient told me
she doesn't want any life-sustaining procedures except under some
circumstances" is not nearly as useful as one that states:
On rounds today, the patient told me that she had thought
about her current situation since being in the hospital. She
still wants me to work up and treat her condition, but told
me that she does not want to be resuscitated. She approves
being placed on a ventilator, if it is for a limited time and
could help reverse an acute problem. However, if she be-
comes ventilator dependent, and it is unlikely that she can
be weaned from the ventilator in a few days to two weeks or
so, she does not want to be ventilator-dependent indefinitely.
Under such circumstances, she would want the ventilator
discontinued.
The other witness, who most likely will be a nurse or other HCP
familiar with the case, should document the conversation more
briefly, but still better than, "I agree with the above." For example, in
the above case, "I witnessed this conversation and agree that the pa-
tient wants limits placed on ventilator use and does not want to be
resuscitated," would be appropriate.
Since many patients do not make explicit directives, someone fa-
miliar with their wishes may have to advocate for them if others try to
deny those wishes. Because the directives may not take effect for
many years, physicians should familiarize themselves with their pa-
tients' advance directives, e.g., annotate conversations, make summa-
ries of discussions, or record reminders about specific wishes of the
patient for subsequent reference.
20. Id. § 5-602(d).
21. The attending physician is responsible for documenting the patient's statements in
the medical record. Id. § 5-602(f) (2) (ii).
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C. Triggering an Advance Directive
An advance directive may be triggered either by a competent pa-
tient or by circumstances that incapacitate a patient for purposes of
making health care decisions. Before an advance directive can be trig-
gered by incapacity, two physicians--one of them the attending physi-
cian-must certify the patient's incapacity in accordance with
statutory requirements. 2 At least one of the physicians must make
the certification within two hours of actually examining the patient, to
ensure that there is not a significant condition change in the in-
terim.23 A second physician is not required if the patient is uncon-
scious or unable to communicate by any means.24 The HCDA
requires physician certification to clarify when decisionmaking by sub-
stitute decisionmakers becomes appropriate. This should help re-
strain attempts to circumvent the wishes of a patient who still has
some decisionmaking capacity.
D. Determining Decisionmaking Capacity
The HCDA reflects the reality that physicians and other health
care providers must deal with de facto competence regardless of any
judicial proceedings. While courts may adjudicate someone's compe-
tence, legal determinations of competence generally do not consider
the subtleties and partial capabilities relevant to health care decision-
making. Thus, the term "decisionmaking capacity" is preferred to the
term "competence" with regard to health care decisions.
Determination of decisionmaking capacity has other important
implications, including possible loss of freedom of choice. In the case
of health care decisions, it may trigger an advance directive and signal
that another person should be consulted to make decisions for that
individual.
The HCDA defines incapacity, but does not explain how it is de-
termined.25 Traditionally, various criteria have been used. Primarily,
physicians have been utilized to determine competency and to certify
incompetence. However, while the HCDA requires physician certifi-
cation of someone's decisionmaking capacity, it does not affirmatively
exclude participation of others in making such determinations. This
is important because responsibility for documenting decisionmaking
capacity is not the same as the exclusive right to define it.
22. Id. § 5-602(e)(1).
23. Id, § 5-606(a).
24. Id. §5-602(e) (2).
25. Id. § 5-601(1).
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Competence is not a medical attribute; it is a collection of abili-
ties and skills based partially on biological function and partially on
actual performance in the context of the setting in which that person
lives. Many physically unimpaired people have poor judgment, in-
sight, problem-solving ability, attention, and comprehension. Con-
versely, some people with medical illnesses (such as Alzheimer's
Disease) may still function effectively depending on the setting. Deci-
sionmaking capacity may be partial, it may fluctuate, or it may be suffi-
cient for some situations or choices but not for others.26
Given these consequences, all HCPs should try to evaluate and
document decisionmaking capacity carefully and thoroughly. Some-
times a person's incapacity is readily apparent, while at other times
the assessment should be "three-dimensional"-done over time and in
various situations. While a standard short mental status examination
is useful for measuring cognitive function if attention span is ade-
quate,"' physicians must also recognize that mental status is not
equivalent to decisionmaking capacity and mental status examinations
do not measure "competency. "28
A more consistent approach to decisionmaking capacity determi-
nations among HCPs requires additional education. A joint effort
among policy makers, health care providers, attorneys, and others will
be needed to improve this situation. The model suggested by Apple-
baum and Roth provides an excellent starting point for establishing a
model framework for assessing decisionmaking capacity. They ad-
vance a scheme based on four performance levels relevant to determi-
nations of decisionmaking capacity.' Each of the four performance
levels is discussed below.
1. Evidencing a Choice.-Someone who demonstrates an ability
to make a choice by responding to questions, cooperating with a pro-
cedure, or expressing an interest in taking part in decisionmaking evi-
26. See Morris Freedman et al., Assessment of Competency: The Role of Neurobehavioral Defi-
tits, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 203 (1991) (offering a "practical set of guidelines for as-
sessing competency in patients," including the neurological mechanisms underlying
competent decisions).
27. SeeJOSEPHJ. GALLO ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GERIATRIC ASSESSMENT 17 (1988) ("Assess-
ing attentiveness is important because a patient who is easily distracted and unable to at-
tend to the examiner will have poor performance on mental status solely because of
inattention.").
28. Carol H. Winograd, Mental Status Tests and the Capacity for Self-Care, 32J. AM. GERIAT-
mcs Soc'y 49 (1984) (arguing that the Short Portable Mental Status Questionnaire is not
an adequate predictor in assessing self-care).
29. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Competency to Consent to Research: A Psychiatric
Overview, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCH. 951 (1992).
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dences some decisionmaking capacity. For example, a demented
individual who cannot rationally discuss whether they want to be tube
fed, may still push the tube away, pull out an indwelling tube, or an-
swer repeatedly, "I don't want it," in response to being advised about
its possible placement. Often such communication can be useful in
determining whether to perform a high-risk, uncomfortable, or life-
sustaining procedure on someone who did not prepare a directive
and for whom the procedure is of questionable value. The prefer-
ences of even a memory-impaired patient should weigh heavily in the
final decision.
2. Factual Understanding of the Issues. -Factual understanding im-
plies that a person is aware of the nature of the procedure or treat-
ment, its risks and benefits, and facts about other alternatives.3 0 For
example, a person may be able to understand that she is being sent
for an MRI scan because she fell and hit her head, but she may not be
able to understand why an MRI scan is the appropriate test or the
possible consequences of not doing one. Similarly, a partially capable
person may be able to recall in general terms information presented
about cataract surgery and may even be able to understand what it is
for and what it would mean for their vision. That person, however,
may not be able to recall the discussion subsequently or to understand
the explanations about risk or the details of the procedure itself.
3. Rational Manipulation of Information. -Rational manipulation
of information, including the ability to consider the alternatives and
their potential consequences, involves the capacity for reality testing
and judgment." For example, a person who is asked about a feeding
tube would be able not only to explain what is involved in the proce-
dure, but also the likelihood of progressive nutritional deficiency if a
tube is not used, leading to further decline and eventual death.
4. Appreciation of the Nature of the Situation. -Finally, someone
who demonstrates appreciation of a situation realizes they have a
choice, understands what that choice is, comprehends the options
and the consequences of those options, and can explain why they
have chosen a certain option. 2
The standard of decisionmaking capacity should also relate to the
expected risks and benefits of the decision. A low-risk procedure,
30. Id. at 953.
31. Id. at 954.
32. Id. at 954-55.
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such as an X-ray test, will not demand as much thought or discussion
as major surgery or hospitalization in an intensive care unit.
Medical illnesses may affect decisionmaking capacity temporarily
or permanently. HCPs-especially nurses and physicians-should
consider possible reversible causes of delirium, which invariably affect
decisionmaking capacity, especially in anyone with abrupt changes in
mental status or fluctuating consciousness. Common physical causes
of altered mental status include infections, fluid and electrolyte imbal-
ances, and drug toxicity. Such causes are especially common in the
frail elderly and others of any age who have major chronic illnesses or
who take many medications. If necessary, decisionmaking capacity
should be reevaluated after delirium is resolved. Occasionally, those
considered "incompetent" become more capable of making decisions
after their problem is treated.
Also, HCPs should not confuse communication deficits with im-
paired decisionmaking capacity. The HCDA reflects the fact that
some individuals may have effective nonverbal communication capa-
bilities.33 It may be necessary to try different ways to communicate
with these individuals. In such cases, information from those familiar
with the person may be especially important in helping evaluate their
capacity.
HCPs should document specifically the degree and nature of a
person's decisionmaking capacity and its relevance to the required
decisionmaking. For example, an appropriate note would be "This
patient can understand some information, but cannot explain the ba-
sis for decisions. She cannot remember our discussions from the pre-
vious day. Nevertheless, I believe she understood our discussions
about undergoing a biopsy." When a patient's decisionmaking capac-
ity is unclear, appropriate consultants or the patient care advisory
committee may help.
E. Defining the Patient's Situation Accurately
The HCDA requires HCPs to respect patients' wishes as stated in
their advance directives. But some situations arenot discussed explic-
itly in advance directives or it may otherwise be unclear. It is then
necessary to decide whether and how the patient's instructions apply.
For example, a patient may say, "I decline life-sustaining procedures if
my condition is hopeless and there is no possibility that the treatments
33. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(1) (2) (1994) ("[A] competent individual
who is able to communicate by means other than speech may not be considered incapable
of making an informed decision.").
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would improve or restore a desirable quality of life." Several years
later, that person may suffer a head injury, stroke, or pneumonia.
Then or subsequently, several vital questions must be answered: What
is the prognosis? Is the situation hopeless? Are life-sustaining proce-
dures indicated? To what extent could treatment be successful? If
treatment could potentially reverse the acute condition, would it have
a significant impact on the overall prognosis and quality of life?
HCPs mustjointly define such situations properly and determine
the potential for treatment to be consistent with a patient's wishes and
values. Some practitioners are uncomfortable with decisions that re-
quire additional explanations, discussion, and interpretation. HCP
deficiencies in both these areas could undermine the effectiveness of
these provisions of the HCDA.
All HCPs, but especially physicians, must try not to confuse the
issues. Directives limiting treatment options may or may not limit
evaluations to make a diagnosis or the use of unspecified treatments.
Directives limiting cardiopulmonary resuscitation may not be ex-
tended to other treatments for specific medical conditions. These dis-
tinctions are especially important in the care of the frail elderly.
Some physicians mistake potentially treatable acute situations, such as
medication side effects, for exacerbations of irreversible chronic
problems or even for a terminal condition. They may hesitate to in-
vestigate the cause of a problem because of a "Do Not Resuscitate"
order or a premature conclusion that nothing should be done regard-
less of the cause. The law by itself cannot correct such
misunderstandings.
F. Working Effectively with Substitute Decisionmakers
The HCDA defines categories of substitute decisionmakers, which
may be defined as agents, guardians, or surrogates, who may make
health care decisions for another individual. It requires HCPs to se-
lect and communicate with appropriately authorized substitute deci-
sionmakers, and it guides the choice.34 The HCDA also addresses
some potential complications of dealing with substitute deci-
sionmakers. For example, surrogates of the same class may disagree
about the proper treatment options, or the HCP may feel that the
substitute decisionmaker is not being "responsible." If there is no ap-
pointed agent and no one to fill the surrogate role, then health care
providers may need a guardian.
34. Id. § 5-605.
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HCPs, including physicians, should help substitute deci-
sionmakers make decisions that reflect the patient's wishes and inter-
ests. Substitute decisionmakers may not fully understand the complex
issues, or may be confused by the various treatment options; they may
want to abide by the patient's wishes, but may not understand the rele-
vance of various choices. The HCP must effectively present and inter-
pret medical information for substitute decisionmakers.
The substitute decisionmaker must follow the patient's explicit or
implicit wishes (substituted judgment). If these wishes are unknown
or unclear, the substitute decisionmaker should act in the patient's
"best interest"; that is, the decision should seek the best thing that
could be done for the patient, or for a reasonable and prudent person
in the same situation. 5
In applying the best interest standard, the law lists seven criteria
which substitute decisionmakers should weigh when making deci-
sions. These include the likely outcome of the treatment; whether
benefits of treatment outweigh the burdens and risks; the treatment's
impact on emotional, physical, and cognitive function; the associated
pain; and the patient's religious beliefs and values.3 6
HCPs must understand the implications of the "best interest"
standard so they can guide substitute decisionmakers. Many physi-
cians have held that if a condition can be treated, it is in someone's
best interest to do so. But defining best interest is not strictly a medi-
cal issue. Considering medical care as a means to an end implies the
need to assess more than the impact of a treatment upon the medical
condition.
HCPs should also recognize the HCDA's emphasis on consider-
ing the benefits and burdens of specific treatments3 7 rather than
whether the individual should get any treatment at all. Any treatment
may be withheld or withdrawn if it is not in the person's best interest
to offer it. If no treatments are in that person's best interest, then
none need be offered or continued. The HCDA's approach here
should help HCPs focus primarily on medical benefit rather than on
the value of someone's continued existence.
The HCDA requires physicians to refer cases to the facility patient
care advisory committee or petition a court if they believe that a sub-
stitute decisionmaker is making a medically inappropriate decision.3 8
If the patient is not in a health care facility, the physician must refer
35. Id. § 5-605(c).
36. Id. § 5-605 (c) (2).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 5-605(b)(1).
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such cases to court.3 9 Practically speaking, few physicians will wish or
need to use the judicial route. But even before simply using the ethics
committee, HCPs should try to clarify the reasons for a particular deci-
sion. Sometimes, some additional discussion can resolve a
misunderstanding.
In other cases, HCPs must deal with disagreements among surro-
gates. The HCDA creates a specific line of "succession."4" If surro-
gates of the highest available class agree, then those of a lower class
have no authority.4 1 A surrogate in a lower class cannot override one
of a higher class. If surrogates of the same class cannot agree about
withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining procedure, the case
should be referred to the patient care advisory committee.42 If the
patient is not in an institution, and surrogates in the same class disa-
gree, the physician cannot withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining pro-
cedure.43 If a surrogate in one class is not available or is incapable of
making decisions or chooses not to make them, the physician should
consult someone in the next class. 44 A surrogate in a lower class who
disagrees with the decisions of an appropriate surrogate of a higher
class may petition for a court order, but has the burden to prove that
those decisions are not consistent with the patient's wishes or in their
best interest.4
5
A potential problem is the HCDA's definition of "unavailable,"
which includes incapacity to make decisions.4 6 If a potential surrogate
is unavailable, a HCP may consult with those in the next lower class.4 7
Therefore, as with the patient, the issue of determining a surrogate's
capacity for medical decisionmaking may arise. As with patients,
HCPs should use some objective criteria to assess a surrogate's deci-
sionmaking capacity or "reasonableness."
G. Interpreting the Medical Effectiveness of Treatments
The HCDA codifies the ethical obligation to avoid giving medi-
cally ineffective treatment, 48 defined as treatment that, to a reasonable
39. Id. § 5-612(a).
40. Id. § 5-605(a)(2).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 5-605(b)(1).
43. Id. § 5-605(b) (2).
44. Id. § 5-605 (a) (2).
45. See id. § 5-612(b).
46. Id. § 5-605(a).
47. See id. § 5-605(a) (1) (iv) (stating that "unavailable" includes when a "surrogate deci-
sion maker is incapacitated").
48. Id. § 5-611.
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degree of medical certainty, will not prevent or reduce deterioration
of an individual's health or prevent the individual's impending
death.4 9 While this is a good definition, it does not help practitioners
determine whether a treatment meets these criteria.
Again, physicians have a critical role. They must certify medical
ineffectiveness, but not alone define "best interests." The substitute
decisionmaker should decide if a treatment is of value to the patient,
if the physician determines it could potentially help the patient's med-
ical condition.
Physicians must help explain the difference between treating a
condition and solving a problem or improving overall status. They
must be responsible for defining effectiveness and ineffectiveness
carefully and recognize that "best interest" must relate to the overall
objective of treatment in general, while medical effectiveness relates
to a specific disease or condition.50 This is particularly pertinent for
the terminally ill, those in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) and those
with advanced, progressive, irreversible conditions.
Thus, for instance, surgery may potentially correct acute abdomi-
nal distension with fever by removing a section of infarcted small in-
testine in someone with mesenteric artery blockage. But the broader
consequences of the procedure for further improvement, or for sus-
taining a desirable quality of life, may be marginal. Therefore, the
treatment may be medically "effective" but not in the patient's best
interests.
Conversely, a substitute decisionmaker may request a treatment
that the physician feels is medically ineffective. For example, a surro-
gate may request that a patient be placed on a ventilator, but the phy-
sician may believe that ventilatory support is futile (that is, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty the respiratory failure is not
reversible and using the ventilator will not prevent or reduce the pa-
tient's deterioration or prevent impending death). In this case, the
HCDA permits the physician to elect not to provide the treatment.5 "
However, if "generally accepted medical practice" considers a
treatment to be potentially life-sustaining, two physicians must certify
49. Id. § 5-601(n).
50. See Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implica-
tions, 112 ANNALS INrERaL MED. 949, 950 (1990) (asserting that "the goal of medical treat-
ment is not merely to cause an effect on some portion of the patient's anatomy, physiology,
or chemistry, but to benefit the patient as a whole").
51. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(b) (1994). In case of a disagreement, how-
ever, the physician must first refer the case to the institution's patient care advisory com-
mittee. Id.
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and document that the treatment is medically ineffective before it can
be withheld or withdrawn.52 The attending physician must inform the
patient, or an individual acting for the patient, of this conclusion.5"
The patient, agent, or surrogate has the right to seek transfer to an-
other provider.54 If transfer is desired, the request for the treatment
must be honored pending the transfer if the failure to honor the re-
quest would likely result in the patient's death. 5
For example, if a spouse requests CPR for a patient and two physi-
cians document that CPR would be medically ineffective, the attend-
ing physician is not obliged to order CPR. The physician may issue a
"do not resuscitate" (DNR) order (with certification from a second
physician) without an instruction from a patient, agent, surrogate, or
guardian, but must give notice of such action. If the spouse does not
wish a transfer, no further action is needed. However, if the spouse
chooses to transfer the patient, then CPR must be provided if needed
while the transfer is being arranged.
Again, the HCDA does not offer criteria for determining which
procedures should be considered "medically ineffective." For exam-
ple, while CPR is considered potentially medically effective in the gen-
eral adult population, studies on CPR involving nursing facility
patients strongly suggest that CPR is rarely effective and is never advis-
able in unwitnessed arrests.5 6 Thus, although CPR could be viewed as
a "medically ineffective" procedure in this specific population, there is
no provision in the law for allowing the attending physician to declare
CPR of a nursing home patient medically ineffective without getting a
second physician's documentation. This may create problems in
those nursing facilities with limited physician coverage, especially if an
acute event such as a stroke or cardiac arrest has made prompt physi-
cian assessment necessary.
A major benefit of the HCDA is its support for the idea that treat-
ment is reversible if it is not accomplishing its intended purpose.
Prior to the HCDA, many physicians were reluctant to reverse treat-
52. Id. § 5-611(b) (2) (i).
53. Id.
54. Id § 5-613(a)(1) (ii).
55. Id § 5-613(a) (3).
56. See Gary E. Applebaum et al., The Outcome of CPR Initiated in Nursing Homes, 38J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc's 197 (1990); Sissay Awoke et al., Outcomes of Skilled Cardiopulmonary Resusci-
tation in a Long-Term-Care Facility: Futile Therapy? 40J. AM. GERiATRICS Soc'v 593'(1992); R.
S. Gulati et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation of Old People, I LANcEr 267 (1983); Steven H.
Miles et al., CPR in Nursing Homes: Policy and Clinical Realities, 74 MINNESOTA MED. 31
(1991); Steven H. Miles, Resuscitating the Nursing Home Resident: Futility and Pseudfutility .38
J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y 1037 (1990). 1 , I
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ment decisions and withdraw existing treatments. As the potential ef-
fectiveness of a treatment is sometimes unclear at first, HCPs should
consider offering a therapeutic trial or "time-limited treatment." Sub-
sequently, the HCPs and substitute decisionmakers should consider
whether to extend or to discontinue the treatment.
H. Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Procedures
The HCDA contains penalties for giving health care contrary to
an advance directive, and for withholding life-sustaining care against
an individual's wishes.57 The law does not penalize withholding or
withdrawing non-life-sustaining care against someone's wishes, but do-
ing so may potentially create civil liability.
The HCDA prescribes a process to decide whether a surrogate
decisionmaker may authorize withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining procedures. An advance directive that does not appoint an
agent cannot be used to withhold or to withdraw life-sustaining proce-
dures unless the attending physician and a second physician certify
that the resident is terminal or in an end-stage condition,58 or two
physicians certify that the resident is in a PVS.59
1. Qualifying Conditions.-The HCDA defines PVS as a state in
which a person has lost consciousness and exhibits no awareness of
self or surroundings other than reflexively."° Some physicians may be
reluctant to declare any vegetative state as persistent or irreversible
because of rare instances in which patients in prolonged vegetative
states have regained consciousness. Thus, it is significant that the
HCDA's definition of PVS focuses on the awareness of self and sur-
roundings and does not specify any duration of unconsciousness as a
marker of persistence.
The medical literature provides some guidelines for considering
the permanence of a vegetative state. 1 Medical criteria for defining
PVS include: history of extensive brain injury from any cause; abnor-
57. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-610(b) (1994).
58. Id. § 5-606(b)(1).
59. Id. § 5-606(b) (2) (one of the two physicians is to be a neurologist, neurosurgeon,
or other physician with special expertise in cognitive functioning, such as a geriatrician).
60. Id. § 5-601(o)(1).
61. See, e.g., D. Bates et al., A Prospective Study of Nontraumatic Coma: Methods and Results
in, 310 Patients, 2 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 211 (1977); Henry K. Beecher et al., A Definition of
Irreversible Coma, 205JAMA 85 (1968); Ronald E. Cranford & Harman L. Smith, Some Criti-
cal Distinctions Between Brain Death and the Persistent Vegetative State, 6 ETHics Sci. MED. 199
(1979);:David E; Levy et al. Prognosis in Nontraumatic Coma, 94 ANNALS INrNimAL MED. 293
(1981); Daniel Silverman et al., Cerebral Death and the Electroencephalogram: Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee of EEG Criteria for Determination of Cerebral Death, 209 JAMA 1505 (1969); A.
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mal CT scan showing loss of brain substance; lack of awareness of envi-
ronment and self; inability to communicate; and presence of only
reflex or random motor activity to stimulus. 62 These findings should
be made in the absence of sedative, toxic, or systemic complications
that alter the level of awareness. An experienced physician should
perform a careful neurologic examination to establish that pertinent
physical findings exist. As needed, the CT scan may be supplemented
by angiography or other radiographic tests.
The extent to which it is desirable to continue aggressive treat-
ments depends on the overall condition, prognosis, and reason for
the unconsciousness.63 No significant neurological recovery after one
month is a poor prognostic sign, and no significant recovery after six
months is an almost certain indicator of permanence. 64 In non-
traumatic coma, signs suggesting a poor prognosis include absent mo-
tor responses at admission,65 poor motor responses at three days
despite awakening at day one, persistent roving conjugate eye move-
ments at one week, and persistent coma at one week.66 In all cases, a
physician should perform serial neurologic examinations to docu-
ment lack of progress.
Thus, the physician should be flexible in defining persistence.
Making predictions in younger individuals with isolated acute condi-
tions, such as a head injury from an auto accident, may differ from
doing so for the already compromised individual who becomes coma-
tose from a second major stroke. In the latter case, it is probably futile
to continue care for months in anticipation of an expected recovery.
In the former case, it may be appropriate to continue supportive treat-
ments for some months before concluding that there is no hope for
recovery (unless there are clear signs of extensive brain damage).
A terminal condition is considered to be one that, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, will cause an imminent death and is in-
curable, and from which recovery is impossible even if life-sustaining
procedures are used.67 Life-sustaining procedure refers to any
Earl Walker et al., The Neuropathological Findings in Irreversible Coma, 34J. NEUROPATHOLOGY
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 295 (1975).
62. See generally Bates et al., supra note 61 (documenting extensively the criteria and
functioning of 310 patients for purposes of assessing useful indicators for prognosis).
63. Id. at 218.
64. Id. at 216.
65. Id. at 216-17.
66. Id. at 217.
67. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(q) (1994).
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mechanical or artificial means, including artificial nutrition and hy-
dration, for sustaining a person's life.'
Physicians are often asked to quantify a person's remaining life
expectancy or to declare that death is imminent so that a treatment
could be withheld. It is difficult to precisely time an "imminent"
death. In the past, when terminal illness was the only acceptable crite-
rion for withholding treatment, the term "imminent" had been
stretched to mean anywhere from days to months. Because of a physi-
cian's reluctance to agree that death was imminent, a lot of undesired
or medically ineffective treatment was given.
Fortunately, the HCDA's additional categories of PVS and end-
stage condition69 allow physicians to consider a persistent vegetative
state with no likely improvement, or progressive decline with no realis-
tic hope of recovery, as circumstances for withholding or withdrawing
care, even if death is not imminent. This enables physicians to focus
primarily on the potential benefits of treatment for a person's overall
condition and prognosis rather than on trying to predict when they
will die.
2. The Supportive Care Plan.-A supportive care plan implies that
a patient will receive only comfort measures and pain relief, but no
aggressive medical interventions. This may be appropriate in a termi-
nal condition, PVS, or end-stage condition when further treatment is
undesired or is likely to be medically ineffective. Typically, this im-
plies all of the following: do not resuscitate; do not hospitalize; do not
intubate; do not use artificial means of nutrition or hydration; do not
transfuse; do not use antibiotics; and do not use intravenous fluids.
When such an approach is selected, HCPs should ensure that ad-
equate supportive measures are ordered and given. Doing so benefits
the patient and reassures a family or other substitute decisionmaker
that comfort measures are humane alternatives to aggressive medical
intervention. Various HCPs, including physicians, should reinforce
this message, so substitute decisionmakers can overcome reservations
and authorize appropriate limitations. HCPs should not equate sup-
portive care with "doing nothing." Unless they understand the value
of comfort measures, substitute decisionmakers may authorize unnec-
68. Id. § 5-601(m)(1)(i)-(ii).
69. The HCDA defines an end-stage condition as an "advanced, progressive, irrevers-
ible condition" that has caused individuals severe, permanent deterioration and made
them incompetent and completely dependent. Id § 5-601 (i) (1). Furthermore, it must be
determined that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the treatment would be medi-
cally ineffective. Id. § 5-601 (i) (2).
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essary or excessively aggressive treatment to satisfy themselves that
they are not neglecting the patient. Often, they do this because the
HCP has not clarified the options sufficiently.
I. Emergency Treatment
Highly aggressive medical intervention has become a traditional
part of emergency medical care. Thus, prior to the HCDA, emer-
gency practices sometimes contradicted existing limited treatment
plans because hospital Emergency Room (ER) staffs and Emergency
Medical Technician (EMT) teams would automatically provide aggres-
sive care regardless of other wishes.
Under the HCDA, this practice should change. Pursuant to sec-
tion 5-608 of the Act, an EMT can withhold CPR if DNR orders have
been issued in accordance with Maryland Institute of Emergency Med-
ical Services protocols or if oral DNR orders are issued by the EMT
medical command or a physician on the scene.7° This permits subse-
quent limitations on treatment for individuals who enter the emer-
gency medical system because of a sudden illness or accident, or a
panicked request for emergency intervention contrary to directives.
The HCDA authorizes health care providers to give emergency
treatment without consent if the patient cannot make a decision, no
authorized decisionmaker is available, and delay in treatment would,
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, adversely affect a person's
life or health.7 HCPs should use this provision judiciously, and be
prepared to reverse treatment which is later determined to be incon-
sistent with someone's wishes or if an appropriately authorized substi-
tute decisionmaker requests such limits. Even such measures as
placing a gastrostomy feeding tube, or intubation and mechanical
ventilation, are reversible depending on the situation.
III. OTHER ISSUES RELEvANT TO THE PROCESS
A. Physician Withdrawal from Cases
The HCDA permits physicians to withdraw from cases where they
have irreconcilable differences with decisionmaker(s).72 Physicians
have different comfort levels in handling ethical issues, including re-
quests for limiting the scope and duration of medical treatments.
However, a physician's reluctance or refusal to deal with the issues
70. Id. § 5-608.
71. Id. § 5-607.
72. See id. § 5-613 (requiring that the HCP inform the decisionmaker and make every
reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another HCP if requested to do so).
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should be the exception, not the rule. A physician who wishes to with-
draw cannot just ignore the patient's or substitute decisionmaker's
wishes, but must follow certain procedures.7"
B. Physicians and Court Proceedings
The HCDA guides the judiciary in cases regarding the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures.74 Moreover, a judge
may allow a guardian to request withholding or withdrawing of treat-
ment without having to return to court. 5 Typically, however, there
must be a reliable medical basis for making these decisions.
Physicians may be involved directly or indirectly in guardianship
proceedings. Their roles may include assessing a patient's decision-
making capacity, condition, and prognosis and informing a court
about their findings and the basis for their opinions and
recommendations.
Given the number and complexity of such proceedings, and the
significant implications of related decisions, physicians could clearly
have a major impact under the HCDA if they provide thoughtful,
complete, and timely information. Most physicians, however, are re-
luctant to prepare reports or to go to court. Thus, considerable
thought should be given to revamping the entire guardianship system,
to streamlining related processes, and to facilitating the physician's
role, for example, by allowing videotaped testimony or use of a vide-
ophone for remote testimony.76
C. Law, Ethics, and the Overall Problem-Solving Process
Several factors influence how well health care providers manage
these difficult problems. Paradoxically, the HCDA's greater complex-
ity compared with past laws ultimately facilitates the decisionmaking
process and allows greater latitude for both patients and health care
providers, including physicians. The HCDA should help reduce
much of the fear and confusion that now inhibit health care
decisionmaking.
But, like any law, the HCDA cannot guarantee good judgment or
effective decisionmaking processes. Facilities, patients, and HCPs, in-
cluding physicians, all must help this new law serve its intended pur-
73. Id.
74. Id. § 5-612.
75. See id. § 5-605.
76. Another option might be to allow a nonphysician provider to present the views of a
cOllection'of HCPs who have assessed a person's decisionmaking capacity, as long as these
have been discussed and documented appropriately.
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pose. HCPs must understand and adhere to the law's prescribed
processes. They also must collaborate with policy makers and attor-
neys to reduce the fear of consequences that could still continue to
inhibit effective decisionmaking.
Effective handling of ethical issues requires adherence to a ra-
tional, systematic, truly interdisciplinary problem-solving process. De-
fining problems correctly must precede reaching conclusions about
treatment. The varied assumptions and values involved from start
(problem definition) to finish (treatment plan and medical orders)
must be understood by all participants.
D. Improving Physician Participation
One reason for passing the HCDA was to help physicians do a
better job, and to support patients and families in making decisions
without being blocked by recalcitrant physicians. It is important to
look beyond the law at how to achieve these goals better.
There are many reasons why physician participation-like that of
other participants in the processes-may be less than effective. These
reasons may be grouped into problems of knowledge, attitudes, com-
munications, and interpretation. (See Table 1.) Various approaches
can help improve the situation. (See Table 2.)
First, traditional medical education and training has heavily em-
phasized technical training and underemphasized vital issues such as
communicating effectively and learning how to define problems pre-
cisely. Physicians may have trouble effectively communicating infor-
mation, precisely defining and explaining a problem, or assessing
their patients' understanding of their conditions. Those who train
medical professionals must be adept at handling these problems and
at communicating information, so that trainees can learn by example.
Showing people how to do something correctly and providing them
with positive feedback is more effective than just telling them they
must do it.
Second, some health care facilities must improve their systems
and processes for decisionmaking. Fortunately, Maryland's law re-
quiring a patient care advisory committee in health care facilities has
helped somewhat. But some facilities with policies and procedures on
paper are nonetheless weak in implementation and quality improve-
ment processes.
Third, practicing physicians have few incentives to improve their
skills at handling ethical issues. Despite the importance of those skills,
they are not needed to graduate from medical school, to complete
residency programs, or to obtain licensing or certification. Answering
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test questions about handling ethical issues does not adequately re-
flect practical skill in doing so.
Fourth, some physicians still do not take nonmedical issues seri-
ously, but consider them to be "unscientific" matters for nurses, social
workers, or administrators to handle. Physicians from some countries
or cultural backgrounds appear to have difficulty sharing medical
decisionmaking responsibility or discussing issues of limiting or with-
drawing treatment. Medical societies and associations should strongly
support greater, more constructive physician involvement in these is-
sues. Also, physician malpractice insurers should cover ethical deci-
sionmaking principles and practices in their risk management
courses, which physicians often attend to get a reduction in their mal-
practice insurance premiums.
Finally, effective decisionmaking may be inhibited by the fear of
subsequent second guessing, penalties, or liability. For example, nurs-
ing facility staff contemplating removal of a feeding tube may fear sec-
ond-guessing by surveyors during licensure surveys. Thus, consistent
interpretation and clear guidance by agencies overseeing health care
practitioners and facilities can support more effective decisionmaking
by reducing fear.
Previously, many health care facilities have felt helpless in the
face of physician resistance. Now, provider organizations, medical as-
sociations, facilities, and individual physicians with authority, such as
hospital vice presidents for medical affairs and nursing facility medical
directors, should collaborate on these issues. Physician managers
must help educate physicians, improve processes, and clarify appropri-
ate physician roles.
Other HCPs (nurses, social workers, etc.) must assume more of a
decisionmaking role and not defer all decisionmaking to physicians.
They should do as much fact-finding as possible to help physicians
make better decisions. They should consider that how questions are
asked largely determines the answers received. Asking physicians
"targeted" or "guided" questions, like "The patient's best interest has
been determined to be .... What treatment options are most consis-
tent with those conclusions?", is more likely to get the answers needed
than asking open-ended questions, such as, "We need your orders so
we know what to do," or "What is in the patient's best interest?"
E. Problems in Dealing with Patients or Substitute Decisionmakers
Part of the HCDA's success depends on how well health care
providers help laypeople be more responsible decisionmakers. There
are a number of reasons for suboptimal or irresponsible ethical deci-
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sionmaking by laypeople. (See Table 3.) While some problems are
due to personal inadequacies of the patient or substitute deci-
sionmaker, most are related to deficiencies in communication or in
decisionmaking processes, as discussed above. HCPs must recognize
their vital role in improving the communications process, eliciting the
appropriate information, and guiding patients and families to ask the
right questions.
Possible solutions to these challenges include stronger support by
health care facilities and administrators for their practitioners' efforts
to provide relevant information; more acquisition and use of alterna-
tive communications like written, video, and computer-based self-in-
struction to supplement discussions; and redoubled efforts to improve
communication processes. Physicians should help improve these
processes.
Moreover, the whole public education system must assume a
greater role in incorporating discussions of these issues into the gen-
eral curriculum. Laypeople must be trained to make informed, re-
sponsible health care decisions. That training should not await
personal crises, but rather should be as much a part of their ongoing
education as science courses or social studies.
CONCLUSION
Maryland's HCDA has many positive benefits for its citizens and
health care providers. It is a potentially useful model for the rest of
the country, because the benefits of the law-including the emphasis
on rational decisionmaking, consistent processes, and shared respon-
sibility-have broader implications for progress in overall health care
reform. But no law by itself can resolve all the issues it addresses, and
the HCDA has not addressed the technical aspects of how to apply its
provisions better in real life. Thus, it demonstrates that health care
should always be considered in the broader context of how it relates
to all other aspects of our lives. Only then can health care decision-
making be related most effectively to the purpose of health care: a
means to an end, not an end in itself.
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TABLE 1
CAUSES OF SUBOPTIMAL PHYSICIN PARTICIPATION IN
ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES
CATEGORY PROBLEM
KNOWLEDGE 9 Inadequate understanding of the underlying
issues
9 Inadequate understanding of risks/benefits of
various treatment options
e Insufficient knowledge of various options to
manage different situations
* Insufficient knowledge of pertinent laws and
regulations
* Failure to understand individual rights
ATTITUDES * Personal discomfort in dealing with issues
* Personal philosophies and perspectives
considered to take precedence over those of
patients
* Perception of decisionmaking as a power
struggle
* Fear of personal legal or other consequences
for the decisions that are made
COMMUNICATION * Failure to listen to patient/family or staff
9 Insufficient explanation of facts, options to
decisionmakers or other caregivers
e Inadequate responses to patient/family or staff
questions
INTERPRETATIONS * Failure to correctly define the patient's
problem
* Premature conclusion about treatment before
considering preliminary assumptions and
relevant facts
* Listening to family and ignoring legitimate
wishes of patient
* Misinterpretation of current prognosis or
significance of condition change
* Confusion of DNR with "Do Not Treat" or "Do
Not Evaluate"
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TABLE 2
POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO IMPROVING PHYSICIAN
PARTICIPATION IN ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING
EDUCATION
SYSTEMS SUPPORT
" Better training of physicians in
communications skills
" Better training in undergraduate and
postgraduate medical education in
understanding and handling ethical
problems
* More case-based guidance from faculty in
education and training programs
" Better training in the specific details of
relevant laws, regulations
* Requirements for faculty to demonstrate
appropriate knowledge, attitudes, and
skills regarding ethical decisionmaking
" Better systems and processes in health
care facilities for managing ethical issues
" More and more effective feedback from
physician leadership (department heads,
medical directors, etc.) regarding
individual performance in handling
ethical issues
" More readily available resources for
information and expert guidance
" Better support from health care facility
administrations for handling issues
without fear of legal entanglements
REGULATORY * Required basic proficiency in handling
ethical issues as part of licensure and
certification process
* More explicit guidance and consistent
interpretation of requirements by
regulatory agencies
PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT 0 More attention paid by insurance carriers
and by medical societies and associations
* Professional associations emphasize
greater receptivity by physicians to advice
and input from other disciplines
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TABLE 3
POSSIBLE REASONS FOR SUBOPTIMAL ETHICAL
DECISIONMAKING By PATIENTS OR SUBSTITUTE
DECISIONMAKERS
DECISIONMAKERS e They think they understand, so they don't
request more clarification
" They have personal limitations in
comprehending information generally
" They don't want to make a decision
" They are afraid they might do the wrong thing
* They hold out until they hear what they want
to hear
" They misinterpret the information they receive
" They do not admit that they do not understand
HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
" Providers fail to give decisionmakers all relevant
facts about the condition, options, risks,
prognosis, etc.
" Providers give decisionmakers incorrect
information
" Providers erroneously interpret the facts for
decisionmakers
" Providers fail to respond adequately to their
request for additional explanation or
information
" Providers fail to clarify or to understand the
rationale behind the decisionmaker's
conclusions
